MaxedOutMama
Sunday, March 06, 2005
Schröder, the Bush basher
Ah, ah. Don't get irritated with me for that title. Go kick Eckart Lohse in the behind if you are irked, because that was what he wrote in this Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung column, A Bottom-line Approach To The US. It is quite interesting on several counts. Lohse writes that:
Lohse attributes Schröder's attitudes as deriving from being the first post-WWII generation Chancellor without a personal memory of the horror that war wrought. I don't believe that is correct. Germany owes far more than that to the US and its debts are far more recent. Throughout the postwar period the US was a strong supporter and defender of Germany, and by far the strongest factor in Germany's reunification. Also, I believe there is broader and more intense anti-US sentiment in Germany at the present time than in France. I am constantly surprised by the rancor toward France in this country while Germany gets a pass. The UN is currently a body with little power and therefore little sense of responsibility. Much the same could be said of Schröder's Germany, which is the best possible reason for denying it a veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council.
Last year Germany protested to the UK over movies depicting Nazis. The complaint was that no one in Germany even knew how to goose-step any more, and that the effect of such movies was purely prejudicial. Yet here again we see the possibility that Bismarckian nationalist tactics are evolving in a Germany that does not feel its past and does not have a truly unified vision of a world future. Germany's strong support for the Palestinian movement and its depiction of Israel as fighting a genocidal war of domination is proof enough of that. The sickness of anti-Semitic frothing hatred in the Middle East has done far more to abuse those populations than Israel has.
The worst irony of all this is that the hullabaloo in the UN about the Iraqi sanctions forced the US to take a position defending the freedom and right to self-determination of all the nations. Bush has nearly four more years to execute this strategy, and it is one that appears to have the force of history on its side. Contrast that with Germany's policy of cracking down on the largely Turkish Muslim population within its borders, and it will be difficult to escape the consequences within the Muslim world. It is possible that the Bush proposition will be fixed American doctrine by the time he leaves office. If so, Schröder's tactics of building support for Germany by posturing it as the defender of the small nations against the hegemony of the US will have cut its own throat, and Germany will be left to live with the stench of that rotting carcass for a generation to come.
Furthermore Kyoto, which was an excellent stick with which to belabor the US while it was not a reality, is now an active treaty that Germany must deal with at the worst possible time economically. There are solid reasons for Lohse's uneasiness. Neither Germany nor France have played their hands well over the last six years, but Germany, I think, has done itself more damage. It is not that I disapprove of Germany exercising an independent voice. It has that right, as does every country. Yet the politics of triangulation don't usually serve the future well, and Germany must eventually find itself within that future.
The other elements of his U.S. policies have been designed to achieve the goal of achieving post-war normality. Such policies as Germany's participation in the wars in the Balkans and in Afghanistan as well as his resistance to the conflict in Iraq served to reach this aim.Lohse's opinion is that the US can continue to see carefully picked opposition to US policies as a device to win support from other countries for Germany's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. You really should read the full article, which doesn't ramble needlessly. Lohse concludes with the following:
But Schröder's foreign-policy style does have some risks, as the conflict over Iraq as shown. He was able to uninhibitedly exploit his opposition in this issue because he has no emotional braking mechanism. Put another way: Because Schröder just thinks about solidarity with the United States, but does not feel it.My question is this: If the UN is consuming so much political ambition with no focus except prestige, is it not in itself (under the current circumstances) a force creating purely factional politics? I don't know the answer; it is a genuine question I have been unable to resolve in my mind since early this morning when I first read this article.
Lohse attributes Schröder's attitudes as deriving from being the first post-WWII generation Chancellor without a personal memory of the horror that war wrought. I don't believe that is correct. Germany owes far more than that to the US and its debts are far more recent. Throughout the postwar period the US was a strong supporter and defender of Germany, and by far the strongest factor in Germany's reunification. Also, I believe there is broader and more intense anti-US sentiment in Germany at the present time than in France. I am constantly surprised by the rancor toward France in this country while Germany gets a pass. The UN is currently a body with little power and therefore little sense of responsibility. Much the same could be said of Schröder's Germany, which is the best possible reason for denying it a veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council.
Last year Germany protested to the UK over movies depicting Nazis. The complaint was that no one in Germany even knew how to goose-step any more, and that the effect of such movies was purely prejudicial. Yet here again we see the possibility that Bismarckian nationalist tactics are evolving in a Germany that does not feel its past and does not have a truly unified vision of a world future. Germany's strong support for the Palestinian movement and its depiction of Israel as fighting a genocidal war of domination is proof enough of that. The sickness of anti-Semitic frothing hatred in the Middle East has done far more to abuse those populations than Israel has.
The worst irony of all this is that the hullabaloo in the UN about the Iraqi sanctions forced the US to take a position defending the freedom and right to self-determination of all the nations. Bush has nearly four more years to execute this strategy, and it is one that appears to have the force of history on its side. Contrast that with Germany's policy of cracking down on the largely Turkish Muslim population within its borders, and it will be difficult to escape the consequences within the Muslim world. It is possible that the Bush proposition will be fixed American doctrine by the time he leaves office. If so, Schröder's tactics of building support for Germany by posturing it as the defender of the small nations against the hegemony of the US will have cut its own throat, and Germany will be left to live with the stench of that rotting carcass for a generation to come.
Furthermore Kyoto, which was an excellent stick with which to belabor the US while it was not a reality, is now an active treaty that Germany must deal with at the worst possible time economically. There are solid reasons for Lohse's uneasiness. Neither Germany nor France have played their hands well over the last six years, but Germany, I think, has done itself more damage. It is not that I disapprove of Germany exercising an independent voice. It has that right, as does every country. Yet the politics of triangulation don't usually serve the future well, and Germany must eventually find itself within that future.
